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Abstract
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, a number of foreign
governments enacted stabilization measures to protect their domestic economies in the
wake of the global credit crunch. The Bank Recapitalization Fund (the Fund), announced by
the South Korean government on December 18, 2008, and implemented on February 15,
2009, was one such intervention intended to assist Korean commercial banks in
strengthening their capital bases and thus restore normal lending practices between banks
and nonfinancial institutions. Invoking its authority under Article 65, Section 3
(“Emergency Credit to Financial Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the Bank of Korea Act, the
government committed up to KRW 20.0 trillion for the purchase of preferred shares,
hybrid securities, or subordinated debt from participating banks. Each bank wishing to
utilize the fund was required to sign with the Korean government a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) stating its commitment to using the funds gained from the sales to
support the real economy. Continued individual usage, interest rates, and restrictions were
determined based on the institution’s adherence to the MoU terms. On March 31, 2009, the
Fund purchased approximately KRW 4.0 trillion in hybrid securities and subordinated debt
from eight Korean banks and financial institutions. By December 2011, the government had
recovered KRW 2.8 trillion through bond sales and bank buyback arrangements. The
remaining KRW 1.2 trillion was repaid to the government by August 2016, at which point
the Fund ceased operations.
Keywords: capital injection, capital adequacy ratio, Financial Services, Commission, Global
Financial Crisis, South Korea

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the Global Financial Crisis that pertain to broad-based capital injection
programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
2Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
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South Korea: Bank Recapitalization Fund

At a Glance
In the wake of Lehman Brothers’ collapse
on September 15, 2008, governments
around the world enacted stabilization
measures to protect their domestic
economies from the massive disruption in
global credit markets. Among them, the
Republic of Korea sought to implement a
series of short-term interventions that
would both boost liquidity and restore
healthy lending between banks and
nonfinancial institutions, particularly small
and midsize enterprises (SMEs). One such
program was the Bank Recapitalization
Fund (the Fund), announced on December
18, 2008, and implemented on February 15,
2009, as part of the Financial Services
Commission (FSC) plan of action in
response to the Global Financial Crisis.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To strengthen the capital base of banks in
order to encourage lending to nonfinancial
institutions, particularly SMEs, through the purchase
of preferred shares, hybrid securities, or
subordinated debt from Korean commercial banks.
Announcement
Date/Operational
Date

December 18, 2008/

Expiration Date

August 2016

Usage

KRW 4.0 trillion by eight
private banks and financial
institutions

Participants

Woori Financial Holdings,
Woori Bank, Kookmin Bank,
Hana Bank, NH Bank, Suhyup
Bank, Kyongnam Bank,
Kwangju Bank

February 15, 2009

Invoking its authority under Article 65,
Financial Services
Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial Overseer
Commission, Bank
Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the Bank of
Recapitalization Fund
Korea Act, the Korean government
Oversight Committee
committed up to KRW 20.0 trillion3 for the
Article 65, Section 3
purchase of preferred shares, hybrid Legal Authority
(“Emergency Credit to
securities, or subordinated debt from
Financial Institutions”), of
Korean commercial banks. The funds were
Chapter IV of the Bank of
to be raised from a combination of both
Korea Act
private
and
public
sources—KRW
10.0 trillion from the Bank of Korea, KRW
2.0 trillion from Korea Development Bank, and KRW 8.0 trillion from institutional and
private investors.
Korean commercial banks wishing to participate in the Fund were required to sign with the
Korean government a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) stating their commitment to
assisting the real economy. Progress—or lack thereof—toward these objectives
determined individual usage caps, interest rates, and other restrictions. After having
3

KRW 1.0 = 0.00097 USD.

423

Korea: Bank Recapitalization Fund

Engbith

received approval from the FSC, banks could then access the Fund on a capital call basis
when in need of liquidity.
On March 31, 2009, the Fund initiated its first round of bond purchases—KRW 3.5 trillion
in hybrid securities with 30-year maturities and KRW 500 billion in subordinated debt
with maturities of five years and nine months—from eight banks and financial institutions.
By the end of November 2011, a total of KRW 1.3 trillion had been repaid through the
combined sale of KRW 503.0 billion in subordinated securities on the open market and
KRW 800.0 billion in hybrid security buybacks by the issuing banks. On December 9, 2011,
the government initiated an early repayment scheme whereby banks were allowed to buy
back their hybrid securities before maturity. A total of KRW 1.5 trillion was recovered
through this process, and the remaining KRW 1.2 trillion was repaid to the government by
August 2016.
Summary Evaluation
The Korean government viewed the early repayment scheme as an indication of the Fund’s
success in helping banks to recover from the negative impact of the Global Financial Crisis.
However, a report by the National Assembly Budget Office noted that the FSC may not have
done enough to establish the program in a timely manner, as many of the stronger banks
had already raised their Tier 1 capital ratios by the time the Fund became operational.
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South Korean Context 2007–2008
GDP
$1.2 trillion in 2007
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
$1.1 trillion in 2008
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
$24,086 in 2007
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
$21,350 in 2008
converted to USD)

Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system

As of Q4, 2007:
Fitch: AA
Moody’s: A2
S&P: A+
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AA
Moody’s: A2
S&P: A+
$1.1 trillion in total assets in 2007
$1.0 trillion in total assets 2008
89.9% in 2007
96.8% in 2008
Data not available for 2007
Data not available for 2008

Foreign involvement in banking system

Data not available for 2007
77% of total banking assets in 2008

Government ownership of
banking system

Data not available for 2007
22% of banks owned by the state in
2008

Existence of deposit insurance

100% insurance on deposits up to
$41,960 for 2007
100% insurance on deposits up to
$41,960 for 2008

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system

Sources: Bloomberg, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Verrier 2018, World Bank Global
Financial Development Database, World Bank Global Financial Development Database,
and World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Overview

Background
Due to its success in overcoming the market volatility caused by the Asian Financial Crisis
of 1997, the Republic of Korea was thought to have been relatively more prepared than its
Western counterparts to manage the economic fallout from the Global Financial Crisis (Lee
and Rhee 2012). Despite having strengthened its regulatory institutions and policies,
however, Korea was greatly impacted by the subprime mortgage downturn in 2007. This
was partially due to the fact that during the first half of 2008, overseas lenders collectively
withdrew $886 million, and net foreign direct investment turned negative for the first time
since 1980 (Fackler 2008). Such a large divestment would later exacerbate Korea’s inability
to repay its external debts and, consequently, the relatively stable economy remained
vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Harden 2008).
The summer of 2008 brought with it a precipitous decline in confidence as the stock
market dropped 38% and the Korean won fell 30% against the dollar. In alarmed response,
both banks and major corporations, such as Hyundai and Samsung, began hoarding
domestic currency (Harden 2008; Sang-Hun 2008). The failure of Lehman Brothers on
September 15 aggravated matters considerably, sending global credit markets into chaos
and driving further anxieties over the strength of Korea’s export markets and foreign
currency reserves. As the state of the broader economy worsened, individual domestic
banks began to experience the effects of the crisis more directly. Woori Bank, one of
Korea’s largest lenders, faced a serious liquidity shortage when overseas banks began to
refuse to roll over many existing loans and instead insisted that Woori pay its maturing
obligations in dollars (Fackler 2008). The government responded by supplying the bank
with $280 million in dollar loans.
This lending crisis spread rapidly as investors lost confidence in Korean banks’ abilities to
honor their maturing foreign currency loans. Following the collapse of Lehman, capital
outflows totaled $42.8 billion between Q4 2008 and Q1 2009 (Kim 2009). Such a large
selloff, coupled with the depreciation of the won and rising borrowing costs, caused
Moody’s to declare Korea to be “one of the few banking systems in Asia where domestic
deposits are insufficient to fund loans” (Sang-Hun 2008). Furthermore, S&P downgraded
the Big Four Korean banks—Kookmin Bank, Woori Bank, Shinhan Bank, and Hana Bank—
from “stable” to “negative” on October 1. Their ability to raise foreign capital thus
continued to decline (Gup 2010).
Having relatively recently opened its market to the international community, Korea did not
have access to the same emergency sources of foreign currency reserves as did other
countries. It was also more susceptible to market instability due to its transparency and
openness to foreign investment (Fackler 2008). In response to the deleterious effects of the
Global Financial Crisis, the Korean Financial Services Commission (FSC) sought to calm and
protect domestic markets by proposing a comprehensive set of stabilization measures to be
enacted throughout 2009. While other interventions, such as the State Guarantee of
External Debt of Korean Banks (see Engbith 2020), had been announced previously in
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October 2008, the government designed a coordinated response to address the ongoing
market volatility. Aside from the Bank Recapitalization Fund (the Fund), the new plans
provided for the establishment of the Bond Market Stabilization Fund, the Stock Market
Stabilization Fund, and the Bank Capital Expansion Fund. The FSC also issued new
guidelines for the restructuring of distressed companies and tightened supervision of the
financial derivatives market.
Program Description
On December 18, 2008, the FSC released its agenda and recommendations for the
upcoming 2009 fiscal year. Included in those plans was a provision for the creation of the
Bank Recapitalization Fund, an intervention designed to assist Korean commercial banks in
replenishing capital and lending to the domestic economy by raising capital adequacy
ratios by 1.5%. Officially implemented on February 15, 2009, and jointly administered by
the FSC and the Bank Recapitalization Fund Oversight Committee, the Fund was founded
under the legal authority granted by Article 65, Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial
Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the Bank of Korea Act. Importantly, its establishment
allowed the government to strengthen the capital base of all banks—even those meeting
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) capital requirements of 9%—to encourage
lending to nonfinancial institutions, particularly small and midsize enterprises (SMEs),
through the purchase and resale of preferred shares, hybrid securities, or subordinated
debt from Korean commercial banks.
The Korean government committed up to a total of KRW 20.0 trillion4 (2% of GDP) for
Fund purchases. The Bank of Korea (BOK) first utilized the Korea Development Bank (KDB)
as a conduit to channel KRW 10.0 trillion in loans to the Fund. This was due to the fact that
Article 80 of the Bank of Korea Act limited loans to profit-making enterprises (i.e.,
nonfinancial institutions like the Fund) only when “there [was] a severe deflation of
monetary credit.” Because that was not the case at the time, the BOK lent to the KDB (a
financial institution) under Article 65, Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial
Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the Bank of Korea Act.5 In addition to acting as a
passthrough for the central bank loans, the KDB lent KRW 2.0 trillion to the Fund, bringing
the total to KRW 12.0 trillion. The government intended to raise the final KRW 8 trillion by
purchasing banks’ subordinated debt and hybrid securities through the Fund and selling
them to institutional investors in the form of securitized bonds
Of the KRW 20.0 trillion allocated, the Fund used KRW 10.0 trillion for the purchase of
preferred shares (KRW 2.0 trillion) and hybrid securities (KRW 8.0 trillion); it utilized the
other KRW 10 trillion to acquire subordinated debt (FSC 2009a). See Figure 1 below:

KRW 1.0 = 0.00097 USD (World Bank).
Article 80 has since been amended to allow the Bank of Korea to lend to private entities “when severe
impediments to obtaining funds from financial institutions occur or when there is a strong likelihood of their
occurrence such as periods of severe monetary and credit contraction” (Bank of Korea Act, no. 14242).
4
5
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Figure 1: First Purchase of the Bank Recapitalization Fund

Source: FSC 2009a, translated from the original Korean.

Participation in the Fund was open to all Korean commercial banks and financial
institutions, both regional and national. Preferred shares, hybrid securities, and
subordinated debt were eligible for issuance to the Fund by participating banks. In order to
reduce stigma, individual caps on usage were imposed based on a bank’s asset holdings
rather than credit ratings (Lee and Rhee 2012). Banks were assigned, according to the size
of their assets, to Group I, II, III, or IV. Within the limits imposed for each group (as shown
in Figure 5 below), the capital injection amount for each bank was limited to a 1.5%
increase in its capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and varied according to its lending to small and
medium-size businesses. The Fund determined the CAR limits based on a desire to avoid
any imbalance in or concentration of capital support for selected banks (FSC 2009a).
To apply for access to the Fund, a bank was required to sign with the Bank Recapitalization
Fund Oversight Committee an implementation Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
specifying particular commitments to providing liquidity support to the real economy,
SMEs, and corporate restructuring programs. The FSC then continually monitored each
institution’s progress with respect to the MoU obligations and adjust any government
support accordingly. For instance, a bank that did not demonstrate clear progress toward
supporting the real economy could face limited access to the Fund and higher applicable
interest rates in subsequent rounds of bond purchases.
Although participating banks were required to support the real economy and commit to
corporate restructuring, the FSC was not to intervene in bank management. This
stipulation was intended to encourage banks to continue to lend and to take on
restructuring themselves. Specific usage of capital injected was tailored to each bank, and
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the banks submitted a monthly report on compliance with specific conditions attached to
the capital injection (FSC 2009a).
The Fund was managed by a committee consisting of nine members chosen from the FSC,
participating banks, and institutional investors. The chair of the committee was an
academic.
The diverse composition of the committee was intended to reflect different interests in a
balanced way and to ensure transparency in the management of the Fund (FSC 2009a). The
committee decided on applicable interest rates and other conditions of the program. It was
also responsible for reviewing mandatory reports submitted by the banks regarding their
usage of the injected capital.
Outcomes
The Fund provided capital in the form of preferred shares, hybrid securities, and
subordinated debt. The FSC decided what capital to inject after a review of each bank.
While preferred shares and hybrid securities were considered Tier 1, subordinated debt
was categorized as Tier 2. Hybrid securities were to have a maturity of 30 years or longer,
with a call option after five years from issuance; it was also subordinated to the Tier 2
capital. Subordinated debt had a maturity of five years or longer (FSC 2009a).
Prior to the first round of bond purchases, the FSC undertook a review of all Korean
commercial banks to assess their compliance with the MoU terms. Six banks received
“excellent” ratings, while the remaining eight were rated as “satisfactory” (see Figure 2).
An interest rate of 6.59% was imposed on nationwide banks with an “excellent” rating
issuing hybrid securities, while those deemed to be “satisfactory” incurred an additional 30
basis points (6.89%). Similarly, nationwide banks with ratings of “excellent” issuing
subordinated debt were charged an interest rate of 6.49%, while “satisfactory” banks were
charged at a rate of 6.59%. To account for the discrepancy between regional and
nationwide banks’ credit ratings, regional banks were charged an additional 30 basis points
on top of their larger counterparts’ rates (FSC 2009b).
Figure 2: Interest Rates Charged According to Bank Size and Rating
Nationwide
banks
(excellent)

Regional banks
(excellent)

Nationwide
banks
(satisfactory)

Regional banks
(satisfactory)

Hybrid securities

6.59%

6.89%

6.89%

7.19%

Subordinated debt

6.49%

6.79%

6.59%

6.89%

Source: FSC 2011.
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On March 31, 2009, the Fund purchased from eight Korean banks and financial institutions
KRW 3.5 trillion in hybrid securities with maturities of 30 years and KRW 500 billion in
subordinated debt with maturities of five years and nine months. This was the sole round
of purchases conducted by the Fund. The table in Figure 3 details the issuances by bank:
Figure 3: Bank Recapitalization Fund Purchases as of March 31, 2009
Woori
Financial
Holdings

Woori
Bank

Kookmin
Bank

Hana
Bank

NH
Bank

Suhyup
Bank

Kyongnam
Bank

—

1,000

1,000

400

750

100

116

87

3,453

Subordinated
debt

300

—

—

—

—

—

116

87

503

Total

300

1,000

1,000

400

750

100

232

174

3,956

Type/Banks
Hybrid
securities

Kwangju
Bank

Total

Note: Amounts denominated in KRW, billions.
Source: FSC 2011.

By the end of November 2011, a total of KRW 1.3 trillion had been repaid through the
combined sale of KRW 503.0 billion6 in subordinated securities on the open market and
KRW 800 billion7 in hybrid security buybacks by issuing banks (FSC 2011).
On December 9, 2011, the Bank Recapitalization Fund Oversight Committee approved the
implementation of an additional early repayment scheme whereby issuers were able to buy
back their hybrid securities before maturity (see Figure 4 below). This arrangement
allowed four banks,8 whose earnings had increased over the course of 2011, to purchase a
total of KRW 1.5 trillion in hybrid securities (FSC 2011). The outstanding amount to be
recovered was thus lowered to KRW 1.2 trillion, or 29% of the Fund’s total utilization.
According to an internal Bank of Korea report, the remaining KRW 1.2 trillion in hybrid
securities was repaid in full by August 2016, at which point the government closed the
Bank Recapitalization Fund.

Kyongnam and Kwangju banks (KRW 203 billion, March 2010), and Woori Financial Holdings (KRW 300
billion, December 2010).
7 Hana (KRW 100 billion, March 2011), Kookmin (KRW 400 billion, April 2011), and Woori Bank (KRW 300
billion, May 2011).
8 Kookmin (KRW 600 billion), Hana (KRW 300 billion), Woori Bank (KRW 200 billion), and NH Bank (KRW
400 billion).
6
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Figure 4: Fund Purchases and Repayment of Hybrid Securities
Amount to be
repaid
(December 2011)

Institution

Allocated
amount

Repaid amount
(March 2011–
May 2011)

Woori Bank

1,000

300

200

500

Kookmin

1,000

400

600

—

Hana

400

100

300

—

NH

750

—

400

350

Suhyup

100

—

—

100

Kyongnam

116

—

—

116

87

—

—

87

3,453

800

1,500

1,153

Kwangju
Total

Remaining
amount

Note: Amounts denominated in KRW, billions.
Source: FSC 2011.

Key Design Decisions
1.

Part of a Package: The Fund was announced by the Korean government as one of
a series of short-term stabilization measures announced on December 18, 2008,
in response to the Global Financial Crisis.

On December 18, 2008, the Financial Services Commission announced a package of shortterm stabilization measures to be implemented throughout 2009. Among other
interventions intended to boost liquidity within the Korean economy, the FSC plans
provided support for the domestic financial markets through the establishment of the Bond
Market Stabilization Fund and the Stock Market Stabilization Fund, bolstered the
soundness of capital reserves through the Bank Capital Expansion Fund, and increased
consumer confidence with a series of amendments to existing debt repayment laws.
Furthermore, the FSC laid out plans to oversee the restructuring of distressed companies
and tighten supervision of the financial derivatives market.
2.

Legal Authority: The Korean government created the Fund under the authority
granted by Article 65, Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial Institutions”), of
Chapter IV of the Bank of Korea Act.

Article 65, Section 3 (“Emergency Credit to Financial Institutions”), of Chapter IV of the
Bank of Korea Act stipulates the following:
The Bank of Korea may, in any of the following subparagraphs, extend credits to any
financial institution secured on assets whose properness has been temporarily granted
with the consent of not less than four members:
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(1) Where it extends credits temporarily to any financial institution in a vital
emergency in which the stabilization of currency and banking business are directly
threatened.
3.

Governance/Administration: The Fund was managed by a committee consisting
of nine members chosen from the FSC, participating banks, and institutional
investors. The chair of the committee was an academic.

The diverse composition of the committee was intended to reflect different interests in a
balanced way and to ensure transparency in the management of the Fund (FSC 2009a). The
committee decided on applicable interest rates and other conditions of the program. It was
also responsible for reviewing mandatory reports submitted by the banks regarding their
usage of the injected capital.
4.

Size: Drawing upon public and private sources of funding, the Korean
government committed a total of KRW 20.0 trillion for Fund purchases.

The Bank of Korea utilized the Korea Development Bank as a conduit to channel KRW 10.0
trillion in loans to the Fund. This was due to the fact that Article 80 of the Bank of Korea Act
limited loans to profit-making enterprises (i.e., nonfinancial institutions like the Fund) only
when “there [was] a severe deflation of monetary credit.” Because that was not the case,
the BOK lent to the KDB (a financial institution) under Article 65 of the Bank of Korea Act.
The KDB lent an additional KRW 2.0 trillion, bringing the total to KRW 12.0 trillion.
The government intended to raise the final KRW 8.0 trillion by purchasing banks’
subordinated and hybrid securities through the Fund and selling them to institutional
investors in the form of securitized bonds.
Of the KRW 20.0 trillion allocated, the Fund used KRW 10.0 trillion for the purchase of
preferred shares (KRW 2.0 trillion) and hybrid securities (KRW 8.0 trillion); it utilized the
other KRW 10.0 trillion to acquire subordinated debt (FSC 2009a).
5.

Source of Injections: The Fund provided capital in the form of preferred shares,
hybrid securities, and subordinated debt.

The FSC decided what capital to inject after a review of each bank. While preferred shares
and hybrid securities were considered Tier 1, subordinated debt was categorized as Tier 2.
Hybrid securities were to have a maturity of 30 years or longer, with a call option after five
years from issuance; it was also subordinated to the Tier 2 capital. Subordinated debt was
to have a maturity of five years or longer (FSC 2009a).
On March 31, 2009, the Fund purchased from eight Korean banks and financial institutions
KRW 3.5 trillion in hybrid securities with maturities of 30 years and KRW 500 billion in
subordinated debt with maturities of five years and nine months. This was the sole round
of purchases conducted by the Fund. The table in Figure 3 details the issuances by bank.
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Eligible Institutions: All Korean commercial banks, both regional and national,
were eligible for Fund use.

In designing the program, the Korean government aimed to increase BIS ratios among
Korean banks by 1.5%. However, it was not a requirement for participation that banks’
capital adequacy ratios fall below a certain threshold; on the contrary, the Fund allowed
the government to inject capital into banks with ratios above the BIS requirement of 9%,
which had previously not been legally feasible. It was thus hoped that providing stronger
capital bases for commercial banks would encourage increased lending to the real
economy.
Banks could voluntarily access the Fund when in need of capital.
7.

Individual Participation Limits: Caps on individual banks’ participation were
imposed according to each bank’s asset holdings.

Banks were assigned, according to the size of their assets, to Group I, II, III, or IV. Within the
limits imposed for each group (as shown in Figure 5 below), the capital injection amount
for each bank was limited to a 1.5% increase in its capital adequacy ratio and varied
according to its lending to small and medium-size businesses. The Fund determined the
CAR limits based on a desire to avoid any imbalance in or concentration of capital support
for selected banks (FSC 2009a).
Figure 5: Groups for Individual Capital Injection Amount

Group
Limits on
capital
injection
Banks in the
group

Group I
(assets of more
than KRW 200
trillion)

Group II
(assets of KRW
140 trillion–200
trillion)

Group III
(assets of KRW
50 trillion–140
trillion)

Group IV
(assets of less
than KRW 50
trillion)

Max KRW 2 trillion

Max KRW
1.5 trillion

Max KRW 1 trillion

Max KRW
300 billion

Kookmin, Woori,
Shinhan

Hana, NongHyup
(NH), Industrial
Bank of Korea

Korea Exchange
Bank, Citi, SC Cheil

Suhyup and other
regional banks

Source: FSC 2009a

8.

Pricing Terms: A bank’s access to the Fund was contingent upon how well the
bank provided liquidity support to the real economy, SMEs, and corporate
restructuring programs.

Initial interest rates for participation were dictated by the scoring grid described in Figure
2 above. Upon applying for access to the program, each bank was required to sign with the
Korean government an MoU stating its continued commitment to assisting the real
economy. The FSC then conducted monthly progress assessments and adjusted accordingly
the terms of Fund utilization, interest rates, and other usage restrictions. These reviews
took place throughout November and December 2008 (FSC 2009a).
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FSC’s review of the commercial banks’ compliance with the MoU terms resulted in six
banks receiving “excellent” ratings, while the remaining eight received “satisfactory”
ratings. An interest rate of 6.59% was imposed on nationwide banks with an “excellent”
rating issuing hybrid securities, while those deemed to be “satisfactory” incurred an
additional 30 basis points (6.89%). Similarly, nationwide banks with ratings of “excellent”
issuing subordinated debt were charged an interest rate of 6.49%, while “satisfactory”
banks were charged at a rate of 6.59%. To account for the discrepancy between regional
and nationwide banks’ credit ratings, regional banks were charged an additional 30 basis
points on top of their larger counterparts’ rates (FSC 2009b).
9.

Debt Restructuring: Although participating banks were required to support the
real economy and commit to corporate restructuring, the FSC was not to
intervene in bank management.

This stipulation was intended to encourage banks to continue to lend and to take on
restructuring themselves. Specific usage of capital injected was tailored to each bank, and
the banks submitted a monthly report on compliance with specific conditions agreed upon
in their individual MoUs (FSC 2009a).
10. Exit Strategy: Initially, no end date was set for the Fund’s operation.
According to the Fund’s internal operating rules, its activities were to be terminated upon
full repayment.
On December 9, 2011, the Bank Recapitalization Fund Oversight Committee approved the
implementation of an additional early repayment scheme whereby issuers were able to buy
back their hybrid securities before maturity. This arrangement allowed four banks, 9 whose
earnings had increased over the course of 2011, to purchase a total of KRW 1.5 trillion in
hybrid securities (FSC 2011). The outstanding amount to be recovered was thus lowered to
KRW 1.2 trillion, or 29% of the Fund’s total utilization.
The remaining KRW 1.2 trillion in hybrid securities was repaid in full by August 2016, at
which point the Bank Recapitalization Fund ceased operations.

Evaluation
The Korean government viewed the implementation of the early repayment scheme as an
indication that “banks [had] successfully recovered from the 2008 global financial crisis”
(FSC 2011). Lee and Rhee (2012) have also characterized the Fund as a general success,
providing “a safeguard to banks against possible substantial losses” without imposing any
“fiscal burden.”

Kookmin (KRW 600 billion), Hana (KRW 300 billion), Woori Bank (KRW 200 billion), and NH Bank (KRW
400 billion).
9
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However, a report published in July 2009 by the National Assembly Budget Office (NABO)
noted that the government may not have done enough to establish the program in a timely
manner; most banks had already raised their Tier 1 capital ratios in 2008, and those that
had not were likely to face scrutiny for contributing to the Fund. Furthermore, concerns
about government interference in bank management may have caused larger institutions,
such as Citigroup and SC Cheil Bank, to decline participation (NABO 2009). A press release
published by the FSC in February 2009, by contrast, had assured potential participants that
the government would not intervene in the banks’ normal operations (FSC 2009a).
Additionally, a press release published by the FSC in July 2009 asserted that although
banks may not have used the Fund to its maximum potential, the Fund acted as an excellent
backup that shored up confidence in the banking system, allowing banks to increase capital
from the market, and minimized cost to public funds (FSC 2009d).
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